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Abstract. Many real-world scenarios require the random selection of one or
more individuals from a pool of eligible candidates. One example of especial
social relevance refers to the legal system, in which the jurors and judges are
commonly picked according to some probability distribution aiming to avoid bi-
ased decisions. In this scenario, ensuring auditability of the random drawing
procedure is imperative to promote confidence in its fairness. With this goal in
mind, this article describes a protocol for random drawings specially designed
for use in legal systems. The proposed design combines the following proper-
ties: security by design, ensuring the fairness of the random draw as long as
at least one participant behaves honestly; auditability by any interested party,
even those having no technical background, using only public information; and
statistical robustness, supporting drawings where candidates may have distinct
probability distributions. Moreover, it is capable of inviting and engaging as
participating stakeholders the main interested parties of a legal process, in a
way that promotes process transparency, public trust and institutional resilience.
An open-source implementation is also provided as supplementary material..
Keywords: randomization; statistical sampling; auditability; security by de-
sign; legal systems.
The function of the legal system is the... congruent
generalization of normative behavior expectations.
Niklas Luhmann (1985), A Sociological Theory of Law.
1. Introduction
Randomization procedures are routinely used in the design of scientific experiments, in
medical trials, and in the operation of legal systems. Its use is motivated by the capacity
to shield processes against the possibility of all sorts of information biases, extraneous
influences, illegitimate interference or spurious manipulations, independently from in-
tention, concealment, or manifestation. Indeed, in the general framework of randomized
experiments [28, p.340-348], this shielding is accomplished via a composition of two ope-
rations: intervention and randomization. In medical trials, for example, the intervention
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is realized when a set of participants, called the experiment group, is treated with the new
drug that needs to be tested. The remaining participants, collectively called the control
group, may then receive no intervention, or simply a placebo (aiming to distinguish even-
tual psychological effects created by the test itself). However, for a variety of reasons, the
decision to which group a patient is assigned may be biased by those conducting the trials;
analogously, knowledge about the assignment process itself may allow a participant to in-
fer its corresponding group. Hence, aiming to produce reliable results, the patient-group
allocation should be unpredictable for all entities involved, i.e., it should be realized via
randomization.
In the specific context of legal procedures, randomization is employed by many
countries as a tool to avoid (the perception of) biased decisions. Examples include the
selection of jurors [6] and judges [7], in which the main goal is to guarantee that each
candidate has a pre-defined (not necessarily uniform) probability of being picked. In this
scenario, though, randomization comes with two additional requirements: auditability by
design and active social engagement. More precisely, auditability by design improves
the trust in the system. Hence, it can avoid suspicions commonly raised when statistical
deviations are observed in a non-auditable random procedure [19], even if such biases
are not the result of ill-intent. Meanwhile, an active, self-reflective and well-coordinated
participation by pertinent members of a community can result in more engagement and
inclusiveness, relevant aspects of social practices that also apply to the legal system [36,
40]. Combined, such requirements can help legal systems to achieve an important goal: to
ensure that its norms (expressed as laws, procedures and regulations) are well understood,
recognized, valued [17, 18, 36].
The scientific understanding of randomization procedures is linked to develop-
ment of mathematical statistics and cryptography (for a historical overview, see [19, 35]).
After all, randomness is a critical component of any cryptographic solutions involving
secret keys, leading to the need of tools for generating (pseudo)random numbers and for
statistically assessing their suitability [11, 23, 25, 29]. Ensuring that the randomness ge-
nerator can be audited by anyone, on the other hand, is a more challenging issue. Some
solutions in the literature rely on on the concept of “open hardware”, so anyone with te-
chnical enough background can (at a given time) examine and evaluate the internal circuit
and components of the hardware responsible for generating randomness [14]. There are
also proposals that rely on distributed solutions that are expected to generate randomness
as part of its regular operation, such as cryptocurrencies [32], thus facilitating auditing
by non-technicians. One drawback of this approach, however, is that the resulting ap-
plication’s security and availability may be affected by external events unrelated to the
application itself, but typical of the underlying solution (e.g., forks, implementation bugs,
or collusion attacks) [2, 39]. Traditionally, auditability of random results has been dis-
cussed by protocols for online games involving chance [9, 13, 34]. Nevertheless, the
requirements in those applications are commonly different from the drawing in legal pro-
cedures, in particular due to the asymmetry of participants (e.g., the casino owner vs. the
players) and the focus on strictly uniform probability distributions.
In this article, we describe an auditable random drawing protocol that combines
social engagement and support for multiple probability distributions. Therefore, it is par-
ticularly suited for the context of legal procedures. The solution builds upon the properties
of hash-based bit-commitment mechanisms [21], so it can be executed quite efficiently.
In addition, the scheme’s security does not rely on any third-party system; instead, its
fairness is assured as long as at least one stakeholder participating in the drawing cor-
rectly executes the protocol. At the same time, auditability in the system requires no
software or hardware analysis, but only the set of messages publicly exchanged among
the stakeholders.
Section 2 discusses the use and importance of randomization in legal procedure,
using the Brazilian legal system as an example. Section 3 presents the proposed proto-
cols in detail. Section 4 analyzes the different security aspects of the protocol. Section
5 presents some examples of the protocols developed in this article applied to typical
operations in the legal system. Section 6 presents our final considerations.
2. The role of randomization in legal systems: the case of Brazil
The consolidation of modern democracies presupposes the separation of powers. In par-
ticular, an independent judicial branch is commonly seen as essential to properly check
an excessive or abusive exercise of power by the other branches of government [10]. At
the same time, such independence promotes the impartiality of judges, i.e., the absence
of personal interests or preferences in a trial [20]. The importance of a impartial judici-
ary is such that it was elevated to the status of a fundamental guarantee by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, whose Article 10 states that “Everyone is entitled in full
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him” [38].
In Brazil, impartiality is closely related to the guarantee of the natural judge, i.e.,
everyone shall be entitled to be judged by a court and a judge previously designated in
accordance with the law. In this context, it is important to ensure a random distribution
of the lawsuits among the several judges and/or justices that compose the courts of first
instance, the tribunals of second instance and the supreme courts. Accordingly, apart from
exceptions established by law, the distribution of cases must be randomized, so there is
no prior designation of the judge and all members of the court receive a similar number
of cases. In particular, a random distribution is important in repetitive demands for which
there are different interpretations of the same law by each judge. After all, impartiality
would be at risk if a plaintiff could somehow manipulate the distribution criteria aiming
to have a case attributed to a judge who ruled it favorably.
Recognizing the importance of randomization in the legal system, the Brazilian
Code of Civil Procedure establishes that “ distribution [of cases] will be made according
to the internal rules of procedure of the court, observing the alternation, electronic draw
and publicity”[5, Art. 930]. In the Federal Supreme Court, this is accomplished via a
computerized system that is expected to be public and have its data accessible to interes-
ted parties [37, Art. 66]. Such publicity is in accordance with the Brazilian Access to
Information Act (AIA) [4], which stipulates as a rule the access to all information and
data held by the Government. However, the computer system responsible for distributing
lawsuits has never had its details publicized, and the successive requests for doing so have
been denied by the supreme court [31]. One of the main arguments for the refusal is that
the specification and source code employed by this system should be covered by secrecy,
evoking one caveat contained in the Brazilian AIA [4, Art. 22]: “The provisions of this
Law do not exclude the other legal hypotheses of secrecy and secrecy of justice or the hy-
potheses of industrial secrecy arising from the direct exploitation of economic activity by
the State or by a natural person or private entity that has any link with the public autho-
rities”. In practice, however, such secrecy creates a “security through obscurity”system,
which has been considered a poor practice by security practitioners for more than 100
years due to its inherent lack of auditability [12]. Hence, there are no technical grounds
to support secrecy of the algorithms and source code employed, while the legal grounds
are still a matter of dispute.
Unfortunately, until this controversy is resolved (e.g., by the bill of law 8503/2017,
which compels the removal of such secrecy [30]), the system will remain unable to pro-
vide enough transparency to assuage eventual suspicion and distrust, even if unjustified.
This issue is especially troublesome when we consider that the Supreme Court is often
called to decide delicate questions that are subject of heated debate in the society at large.
In such cases, any distrust motivated by security by obscurity may spill over other so-
cial systems, spreading institutional discredit to a much wider scope and, in so doing,
potentially threaten social harmony or stability [18].
Such concerns motivate the development of proposals following a security by de-
sign concept, which implies that the system’s security does not depend on the secrecy of
its implementation or of its components [22, Sec. 2.4]. In the specific case of Brazil,
this approach is expected to avoid any clashes with the principles of publicity imposed
by the Federal Constitution, the Code of Civil Procedure and the AIA. The main goal of
the remainder of this article is to show that it is possible to specify and implement such a
solution having transparency and auditability at its core.
3. Auditable random draw
In this section, we describe the process of randomly drawing some entity among a list of
eligible candidates. The proposed protocols build upon the ideas originally discussed by
M. Blum for solving the “Coin-flipping by telephone” problem [1, 3], where two mutually
untrusted parties play a virtual coin tossing game: after each player chooses “heads” or
“tails”, an outcome is randomly drawn in such a manner that both players can verify
the fairness of the result (i.e., in this case, that each one had a 50% chance of winning).
Basically, the solution employs a commit-and-reveal scheme [21], leading to a protocol
that is general enough to be applied in a variety of applications. Indeed, it has been
traditionally employed in protocols for online gambling [9] and peer-to-peer card games
[34]. In this article, though, we focus specifically on the context of legal cases, assuming
that entities like judge, juror(s), rapporteur, or the court itself must be selected at random
in a judicial proceeding.
We discuss two main protocols: one version where a single drawing is required
for a given proceeding, and an extension that optimizes latency and bandwidth usage
in scenarios where multiple entities must be simultaneously drawn for the same or for
several proceedings. We also discuss some possible protocol variants, as well as how the
described schemes could be instantiated in for handling real-world judicial proceedings.
3.1. Preliminaries: formal description and notation
For convenience to the reader, Table 1 lists the general notation adopted hereinafter.
Tabela 1. General notation
Symbol Definition
λ System’s security level
x
$← X Uniform sampling of an element x from space X
|Y | Number of elements in a set or list Y
Draw A random drawing procedure
∆ = {Draw0, . . .} A list of drawing procedures
S = {s0, . . .} Set of stakeholders sj participating in drawing procedure Draw
E = {e0, . . .} Ordered list of eligible candidates ej in drawing procedure Draw
DID Unique identifier of a drawing procedure Draw
info Any metadata related to drawing procedure Draw
share A stakeholder’s contribution to the random draw
C Commitment to the contribution share in a given drawing
mask A random masking value: hides contribution share in commitment C
d The result of the random draw
pk, sk An entity’s public and private keys, respectively
H(M) Hash of an arbitrary message M
σ A digital signature
S(sk,M) Signing message M using private key sk
V(pk,M, σ) Verification of signature σ on message M , using public key pk
In the described protocols, we consider that each drawing procedure Draw can be
represented by the set of fields {DID, S, E, info}, described as follows:
• DID (mandatory): a unique identifier for the drawing procedure. In particular,
when a drawing is associated with a proceeding whose unique identifier is PID,
one might simply make DID = PID||cnt, where || denotes concatenation (using a
suitable, reserved character) and cnt is a counter for the number of the drawing in-
side that proceeding. For example, suppose that a proceeding’s identifier is PID =
123.456-7, and that a random draw is required for defining its judge. This first
drawing could then be identified as DID = 123.456-7#0.
• S (mandatory): the set of all stakeholders sj (where 0 6 j < |S|) that must
participate in the random draw as witnesses of its fairness. This set may contain
any number of interested parties, which may be either proceeding-specific (e.g.,
defense lawyer, prosecutor, and judge) or more general (e.g., Ministry of Justice,
Supreme Court, and bar council). Each interested party must be identified by a
public key, so their corresponding digital signatures can be verified during the
protocol’s execution. Without loss of generality, we assume that the public key
pksj of each interested party sj ∈ S is part of a digital certificate issued by trus-
ted Certificate Authority (CA), so that certificate’s fingerprint can be used as an
unambiguous identifier.
• E (mandatory): the list of all candidates ej (where 0 6 j < |E|) that are eligible
to be randomly drawn. For example, it might refer to all judges that are eligible for
the proceeding, excluding entities with conflict of interest; it may also including
duplicates, aiming to handle non-uniform probability distributions (see Section
3.4 for details). The identification of each candidate and their order in the list
must be unequivocal. This can be accomplished, for example, by means of a list
containing their corresponding social security numbers, functional identifiers, or
digital certificate fingerprints, sorted in lexicographic order.
• info (optional): represents all relevant metadata about the drawing in a human-
readable form. This field might include, for example, the proceeding title, class,
subject, and last modification date. This field is left as optional in the protocol
because, if a reliable source is available, such metadata can be obtained from DID
itself.
We denote by H(M) the application of a hash-function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}h
over the arbitrary-length input M . In the protocols hereby described, hash functions are
employed in the construction of a commitment mechanism [21]: after computing and
revealing H(M), an entity becomes “committed” to M , since it is computationally hard
to find M ′ 6= M such that H(M ′) = H(M) for a secure hash function; at the same time,
one-way property of the hash-function prevents anyone from learning the value ofM until
it is deliberately disclosed. We also assume that H follows a fairly uniform distribution
in {0, 1}h, which is standard for secure hash functions. Standardized algorithms believed
to provide such properties include instances from the SHA-2 [24] family.
We write S(sk,M) to denote the computation of a digital signature of input M
using the private key sk, giving as output a signature σ. The corresponding signature
verification procedure under public key pk is then denoted V(pk,M, σ). We assume that
a standardized algorithm is employed for this purpose, such as ECDSA or EdDSA [26].
For all algorithms employed, we assume a security level λ ≥ 128 bits, as it is
usual in modern systems [27].
3.2. Single random draw
Let Drawi = {DIDi, Si, Ei, infoi} represent a random drawing procedure performed by
stakeholders Si. To pick a random candidate from Ei, each stakeholder sj ∈ Si engages
in a two-phase procedure, described in what follows and illustrated in Figure 1.
3.2.1. Commitment phase
Firstly, sj generates a random masking value maski, j
$← {0, 1}λ for security level λ. In
addition, sj picks a random value sharei, j satisfying 0 6 sharei, j 6 |Ei|, which will
later be used as that stakeholder’s contribution to the random draw. We note that, as long
as both maski, j and sharei, j are kept secret and can be considered unpredictable, their
values could be picked arbitrarily by sj or computed using a suitable random number
generator [23, 25].
Subsequently, each stakeholder sj computes its own commitment Ci, j ←
H(Drawi,maski, j, sharei, j) by applying the hash functionH on the drawing data Drawi
(common to all parties), on the masking value maski, j , and on its random contribution
sharei, j . With this approach, the potentially low-entropy hash input sharei, j cannot be
guessed from Ci, j , since it is combined with the high-entropy masking value maski, j
[21].
Finally, sj signs a message containing the commitment Ci, j and the drawing
data Drawi, using the private key skj . The digital signature generated in this manner,
Ci,0Drawi sharei,0
Ci,1Drawi sharei,1maski,1
Ci,|S|-1Drawi maski,|S|-1
. . .
sharei,|S|-1
(mod  |Ei|)
d
maski,0
∑ 
Figura 1. Auditable random draw procedure.
σi, j ← S(skj, {Drawi, Ci, j}), provides authenticity and non-repudiation to the commit-
ment sent by sj , which allows latter auditing. Finally, sj broadcasts a message containing
{Drawi, Ci, j, σi, j} to all other stakeholders sj′ 6=j .
3.2.2. Reveal phase
Upon reception of a commitment Ci, j′ , each stakeholder sj checks the corresponding sig-
nature by running the verification algorithm V(pkj′ , {Drawi, Ci, j′}, σi, j′). Only after all
commitments Ci, j′ 6=j are received and their signatures are correctly verified, stakeholder
sj reveals the pair {maski, j, sharei, j} to all of its peers. Note that it is not necessary
to digitally sign the message revealed in this manner, since {maski, j, sharei, j} was in-
directly signed when computing σi, j: to verify its validity, it is enough to check that
Ci, j
?
=H(Drawi,maski, j, sharei, j) holds true.
Using the random contributions sharei, j from all stakeholders, the result of the
random draw is d = (
∑|Si|−1
j=0 sharei, j) mod |Ei|. The drawn candidate is then set to ed,
following the original order of candidates from Ei. This approach ensures that every can-
didate ej has the same probability of being drawn because, if at least one stakeholder sj
picks sharei, j uniformly at random in [0, |Ei|[, the resulting sum will also be uniformly
distributed in the same interval [33], independently of collusion among other parties. In
addition, any entity is capable of auditing the drawing by: (1) verifying the digital sig-
natures on the revealed values; (2) recomputing d independently; and (3) comparing the
obtained d with the value reported by the stakeholders that participated in the drawing.
3.3. Multiple random draws by the same stakeholders
The process described in Section 3.2 can be extended to enable multiple random draws
to be executed by a group of stakeholders S with a single commit-and-reveal procedure.
This extension is discussed in what follows.
Ci,jDrawi sharei,jmaski,jDrawi-1 sharei-1,jmaski-1,jDraw0 share0,jmask0,j ...
random
Figura 2. Chaining structure enabling multiple random draws from a single com-
mitment.
3.3.1. Commitment phase
Let ∆ = {Drawi} (for i > 0) be a list of random draws {DIDi, S, Ei, infoi} that share the
same set of stakeholders S and that are ordered according to some rule (e.g., following
the lexicographic order of DIDi). Similarly to the single-drawing case, each stakeholder
sj ∈ Si starts by picking a random mask0, j $← {0, 1}λ. In addition, sj picks one ran-
dom sharei, j for each Drawi ∈ ∆, each of which satisfying 0 6 sharei, j 6 |Ei| for
the corresponding Ei. The ∆ commitments from sj are then obtained iteratively: first,
by making C0, j ← H(Draw0,mask0, j, share0, j); the subsequent Ci, j for i > 1 are then
computed as Ci, j ← H(Drawi,maski, j, sharei, j), where maski, j = Ci−1, j . The resul-
ting data structure is illustrated in Figure 2. Finally, the last commitment C|∆|, j computed
in this manner is signed and broadcast to all stakeholders.
3.3.2. Reveal phase
After sj receives and validates all commitments C|∆|, j′ 6=j from its peers, it broadcasts
mask0, j together with all picked values of sharei, j (for i > 0). This allows any entity,
including stakeholders, to verify that the signed commitment C|∆|, j originally provided
by sj was indeed built from mask0, j and the set of disclosed sharei, j: it suffices to
reproduce the aforementioned procedure that, supposedly, was followed by sj when com-
puting each Ci, j . If such verification holds true for all commitments, each random draw
di is once again computed as di = (
∑|Si|−1
j=0 sharei, j) mod |Ei| for each i > 0. Once
again, the fairness of the drawing procedure can be audited by independent entities, who
are able to verify that d was computed from the signed commitments.
3.4. Handling non-uniform drawing probabilities
Many real-world random drawing applications require that n eligible candidates in a list
E have the same probability of being drawn, that is, a uniform probability distribution. In
this case, the ordered list E = {e0, . . . en−1} would contain only distinct identifiers, one
per candidate ej .
Nevertheless, there are situations in which the n eligible candidates must be selec-
ted according to a non-uniform probability distribution P (0), P (1) . . . P (n − 1), where
P (j) > 0 and
∑
P (j) = 1. For example, in the context of legal proceedings, some pu-
blicly available and law-abiding rules may dictate that the judge for a given case should
be picked with higher or lower probability depending on well-established methodologies
and criteria. For example, these criteria may include judges’ current workloads, case
complexities or legal specialty areas, among other. These probability distributions may
even be adjusted along the time aiming to make the judges’ loads converge, in the long
run, to a targeted equilibrium goal. Some statistical methods for calculating, calibrating
and adjusting such non-uniform distributions are discussed in [8, 15, 16].
A standard technique for handling non-uniform probability distributions consists
in repeating the identifier of every candidate ej proportionally to P (j). The case in which
probabilities are expressed as fractions with a common denominator, P (j) = aj/b is sim-
ple to handle: we only have to build E as a b-long list where the identifier for each candi-
date ej appears (e.g., contiguously) a total of aj times. For example, if we need a random
draw among 4 candidates with probability distributions {1/10, 2/10, 3/10, 4/10}, where
b = 10, we would have E = {e0, e1, e1, e2, e2, e2, , e3, e3, e3, e3}. Taking as common de-
nominator a larger integer power of ten, i.e. b = 10k, allows for a good approximation of
any distribution expressed in decimal form, like a centesimal or a millesimal scale for a
common denominator of b = 100 or b = 1000.
The case in which probabilities are expressed as fractions in canonical form,
P (j) = aj/bj , with no common denominator, is handled as follows: (1) compute
` ← lcm(b0, b1, . . .), i.e., the lowest common multiple of the fractions’ denominators,
bj; and (2) build E as a `-long list where the identifier for each candidate ej appears
(e.g., contiguously) a total of ` ·aj/bj times. For example, if we need a random draw
among 4 candidates with probability distributions {1/6, 1/4, 1/4, 1/3}, then we would
have `← lcm(3, 4, 6) = 12, and E = {e0, e0, e1, e1, e1, e2, e2, e2, e3, e3, e3, e3}.
Despite repetitions in the list E, we note that the computational representation of
E can remain quite compact: by representing each candidate by the pair (ej, P (j)), no
actual identifier repetition is necessary.
3.5. A possible variant, aimed at better bandwidth efficiency
A slightly modified version of the described protocols can be employed aiming to save
some bandwidth during the reveal phase. This variation consists in use the masking values
maski, j directly as source of randomness instead of relying on the additional random
values of sharei, j . For the single drawing procedure from Section 3.2, this means that
d would be computed by adding up maski, j , i.e., as d = (
∑|Si|−1
j=0 maski, j) mod |Ei|.
In this case, sharei, j itself could be omitted from the protocol, and only maski, j would
be revealed by the stakeholders to their peers. In addition, multiple random draws could
then be implemented without the chaining structure described in Section 3.3: instead,
one could employ a pseudo-random number generator [25] taking as seed the value of d
obtained in the single-drawing procedure.
The drawback of this approach is that the distribution of d computed in this manner
may lead to distortions in the protocol’s probability distribution. Specifically, the lowest
(2λ|Si| mod |Ei|) values of d would have a favorable probability bias: instead of being
selected with probability 1/|Ei|, their actual chance would be 1/|Ei|+ 1/2λ.
Notice that such probability issue only arises in this modified protocol when
2λ|Si| mod |Ei| 6= 0. In addition, the resulting bias should be negligible whenever
|Ei|  2λ, which is likely to be the case in many real-world applications. For exam-
ple, one would expect a small |Ei| when the judge for a procedure needs to be randomly
drawn according to an uniform distribution. Nevertheless, |Ei| may grow for suppor-
ting arbitrary drawing probabilities associated with each candidate. Therefore, aiming
to ensure the wide applicability of the hereby described protocols, we recommend using
sharei, j as an additional value in actual implementations.
4. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the attack surface of the proposed secure drawing mechanism,
considering the security properties of its underlying cryptographic primitives.
4.1. Confidentiality of stakeholders’ contributions in the Commitment phase
Suppose a malicious stakeholder sa is able to learn all contributions sharei, j 6=a from its
peers before sending its own commitment Ci, a ← H(Drawi,maski, a, sharei, a). In that
case, sa can choose the value of di by picking sharei, a accordingly. The confidentiality
of all sharei, j in the commitment phase is, thus, critical for the drawing procedure’s
fairness.
In the described protocol, the confidentiality of every pre-image resistance during
the commitment phase is protected by the underlying hash function’s pre-image resis-
tance. Specifically, to obtain sharei, j , sa would have to find the hash function’s input
(Drawi,maski, j, sharei, j) from its output Ci, j . This requires guessing maski, j in the
one-draw protocol described in Section 3.2, or mask0, j in the multi-draw protocol from
Section 3.3. As long as such masking values are at least λ-bits long and randomly picked,
such guessing attempts should be computationally infeasible.
Notice that the confidentiality of every sharei, j is relinquished in the reveal
phase, when those values are disclosed together with the corresponding maski, j . At that
time, however, it would be computationally hard for sa to modify the already committed
share1, a, picked before any sharei, j 6=a was known (see Section 4.2). Hence, the drawing
procedure cannot be manipulated as long as every sj reveal its own {maski, j, sharei, j}
only after all commitments Ci, j′ 6=j are received from their peers.
4.2. Immutability of stakeholders’ contributions in the Reveal phase
Suppose a malicious stakeholder sa can modify its own sharei, a after learning all con-
tributions sharei, j 6=a from its peers. In this scenario, similarly to the attack described in
Section 4.1, sa can pick a modified value share′i, a that leads to the desired value of di.
In the described protocols, such attack is unfeasible as long as a collision-
resistant hash function H is employed when computing the commitment Ci, a. More
precisely, after sa broadcasts its commitment Ci, a = H(Drawi,maski, a, sharei, a),
the value of {mask′i, a, share′i, a} subsequently revealed would only be accepted as
valid by its peers if the following collision occurs: H(Drawi,maski, a, sharei, a) =
H(Drawi,mask′i, a, share′i, a).
Notice also that attempts to replace Ci, a itself during the reveal phase would also
fail. After all, stakeholders would not enter the reveal phase until Ci, a is received and its
signature is verified.
4.3. Split decision via duplicated commitments
A malicious stakeholder sa might decide to send different commitments to different sets
of stakeholders, leading to a distinct value of d computed in each of them. The result
would be a denial-of-service attack, because there would be no consensus among all sta-
keholders. Even though there is no mechanism to prevent such attack, the culprit can be
easily identified after the stakeholders compare the received commitments. The attacker
could then be penalized accordingly, and the digitally signed commitments could be used
as proof of misbehavior.
4.4. Collusion resistance
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the value of d = (
∑|Si|−1
j=0 sharei, j) mod |Ei| obtained in
the hereby described protocol follows an uniform distribution in [0, |Ei|[ as long as at
least one stakeholder sj picks sharei, j uniformly at random in [0, |Ei|[ [33]. Hence, the
fairness of the random draw is ensured even if |Si| − 1 stakeholders collude, e.g., by
revealing and/or agreeing on their own contributions sharei, j′ 6=j .
We note that, if there is a collusion among all stakeholders (i.e., a consensus), then
it is possible to manipulate the drawing procedure while giving auditors a false impression
of fairness. Hence, the choice of a suitable set of stakeholders S is a critical requirement
in the system. In the specific case of drawing a proceeding’s judge, meeting such requi-
rement should be quite easy, in particular if opposing parties like the defense lawyer and
prosecutor are included as S.
4.5. Impersonation attacks: commitment replay or forgery
The successful impersonation of a honest stakeholder sj might lead to a few undesirable
situations. For example, suppose that both the legitimate and a forged/replayed com-
mitment from sj are accepted as valid in a random draw, Since the resulting duplication
would be indistinguishable from the denial of service attack described in Section 4.3, sj
might be unjustly accused of misbehavior. As another example, suppose that n stakehol-
ders in collusion gather forged/replayed commitments from all of the remaining |Si| − n
stakeholders that would participate in a drawing. In that case, auditors could be tricked
into believing that a given drawing result was fair, when it was actually manipulated by
the colluding parties.
To prevent such attacks, two mechanisms are employed in the hereby described
protocols. First, to prevent forgery, all stakeholders must be unequivocally identified (e.g.,
by their digital certificates) and their commitments must be signed using a secure digital
signature algorithm. Second, to prevent replay attacks, every random draw procedure
Drawi includes a unique identifier; hence, a commitment Ci, j for Drawi would not be
mistakenly accepted as valid in another drawing procedure Drawi′ 6=i.
4.6. Denial to reveal
Any malicious stakeholder sa can engage in a denial of service attack by refusing to
provide either {Ci, a, σi, a} or {maski, a, sharei, a}, preventing the completion of the pro-
tocol’s execution. Even though there are no mechanisms to prevent such attacks from
occurring, the non-compliant parties can be easily identified in the protocol. Hence, ade-
quate measures can be taken in response, depending on the target scenario. For example,
if the contribution from sa is not mandatory, then the drawing procedure could be restarted
after sa is removed from Si.
4.7. Dealing with an untrustworthy server
The described protocol requires sj to broadcast {Ci, j, σi, j} (in the commit phase) and
{maski, j, sharei, j} (in the reveal phase). Such broadcasts can be performed either direc-
tly, using the stakeholders’ network addresses, or with the aid of an intermediate server.
One benefit of the latter approach, though, is that each sj would need to send a single
message to the server, rather than learning its peers’ addresses and sending one indivi-
dual message to each peer. Hence, for better efficiency, such a server-based architecture
may be preferred in actual deployments Meanwhile, security-wise, there would be no im-
pact in terms of security: even if the server is untrustworthy, it would be unable to forge
or modify any of the exchanged messages because they are all messages signed by the
corresponding stakeholders.
The main caveat in a server-based architecture is that third parties interested in
auditing the drawing result should not blindly trust the data provided by the server. The
reason is that the server could collude with a a malicious stakeholder sa for replacing
the latter’s (signed) contribution in the drawing and, thus, manipulate its result from that
auditor’s perspective. Hence, auditors should always confirm that any data provided by
the intermediate server matches the messages actually seen by all stakeholders. Notice
that such confirmation allows auditors not only to avoid tampering attempts, but also ena-
bles the identification of the malicious stakeholder(s) behind this attempt: after all, the
auditor would observe two distinct commitments Ci, a and C
′
i, a signed by sa for the same
drawing Drawi, a situation that should never occur in a regular protocol execution. Actu-
ally, this very possibility of identifying tampering attempts should dissuade stakeholders
from colluding with the intermediate server.
5. Implementation
We have developed a simple Java library that implements all the steps of the protocols
described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. The source code is available under the MIT License
at https://doi.org/10.24433/CO.6108166.v1, so it can be freely adapted for fit-
ting the needs of real-world implementation. It also includes routines for performing the
functional testing of the protocol’s main routines (a reproducible run is made available).
The provided code does not include a graphical interface, since its details would
depend on the actual platform (e.g., desktops, mobile phones or dedicated hardware) and
also on the details of the scenario (e.g., usual number of stakeholders, and whether or
not non-uniform probability distributions are required). We are currently implementing
a prototype mobile application that uses an intermediate server for facilitating the com-
munication among peers. Figure 3 illustrates the graphical interface expected for this
proof-of-concept. Specifically, it shows the look-and-feel for mobile users during:
(a) The commit phase, when 4 stakeholders must send their signed commitments. At
the moment shown in the interface, only two of them (namely, #0 and #3) were
received by the stakeholder (whose identifier is #1) ;
(b) The reveal phase, starting after all commitments are received, when each stakehol-
der reveals its own values of share and mask. The interface shows that two sta-
keholders (namely, #0 and #3) have revealed valid data.
(c) The completion of the protocol, when one of the eligible candidates (namely, #1)
is picked with uniform probability based on the stakeholders’ contributions.
6. Final Considerations
In this article, we describe a collaborative random drawing protocol with arbitrary proba-
bility distributions and whose fairness can be audited by any interested party (including
non-technicians). The scheme follows a security-by-design best practice, contrasting with
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Figura 3. Graphical interface for the described protocol’s proof-of-concept imple-
mentation: (a) commit phase; (b) reveal phase; (c) end of the protocol, with
one out of five candidates being randomly drawn by four stakeholders.
technically unsound approaches based on security-by-obscurity. In addition, it is desig-
ned to allow and invite the active participation of any number of stakeholders or their
representatives. This active engagement of interested parties and social organizations is
intended to foster trust and confidence in the legal processes. Indirectly, it should also
strengthen the institutions that compose a truly autonomous Legal System, enhancing
their harmonious relations with other branches of government and, in this way, promoting
social peace.
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